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Everyone who has spent some years studying informality in countries such as Bulgaria 
ultimately comes to the conclusion that he is dealing with a series of sub-plots, and there is a 
bigger plot; and that, consequently, any policies addressed at formalizing economic activity 
should not remain at a sub-plot level, but also address the main plot. 
 
Informal work is a sub-plot to informal economy.  
Informal economy is a sub-plot to “grey” economy and corruption.  
“Grey” economy and corruption are – as eg. the IMF has now realized – a sub-plot to “good 
governance”.  
 
And, since everything you can imagine feeds into the problematic of good governance, that 
itself is a sub-plot to larger, truly systemic developmental issues.  
 
Thanks to the Inregia-Regioplan  report “Undeclared work in an enlarged Union”, we can now 
address this tangle in more promising ways.  
 
Building on this Report, we are also able to get away from the over-detailed debates on 
measurement2 and concentrate on the anatomy of the problem.  
 
 
The informal work sub-plot 
 
As far as we can see, there are two kinds of informal work as regards perceived legitimacy, 
therefore – the chances of change and therefore – the shape of possible policy.  
 
1) There is the informal household-destined work, in which up to 40 per cent of all 
households engage nationally. This is pre-capitalist, pre-market subsistence production 
out of own plots of land and is seen as traditional legitimate and inoffensive. Not much 
can be done about this, given its perceived legitimacy. This pool of informality can 
slowly dry up as capitalist-market relations begin to digest pre-market forms of 
economic activities.  
2) There is the undeclared provision of goods and services, and the unregistered or semi-
registered hire of workforce that is part of the division of labour and the market, but 
evades registration in order to decrease costs in terms of time, money and discomfort. 
People engaged in this kind of informality are fully aware that they are acting 
illegitimately, and that time and progress is against them.  
 
Building on this lack of perceived legitimacy, institutionalized responses and policies are 
possible. Of course, the belief that time is against the rule-breakers needs to be encouraged, for 
                                      
1 A paper presented at “Informal Employment” – a European Commission meeting held in Brussels (May 
2004) 
2 We at the CSP have, after three years’ work on informality, come down decisively in favour of the kind 
of direct measurements, including the in-depth interviews of typical professions in typical situations 
referred to on p.92 of the Report. Once we know the structure of informal situations, we can hope to 
produce policy responses, and that is to us more significant than arguments over the precise 
measurement of a phenomenon that by its very nature is at best semi-visible.  
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it would be quite another matter were the informals to suddenly become convinced that the 
agents of order are incapable of imposing it. 
 
The grey economy sub-plot 
 
As far back as 20023 we at the CSP came to the conclusion that:  
 
A/ The grey economy, while considerable in comparison with an average EU member, is 
a shrinking remnant of a once universal mentality and practice: of the conviction, which settled 
during the quasi-market activities of the 1980s, that unregistered and Hobbesian-type behaviour, 
including the pilfering of resources and patronage, is what capitalism is all about. By the end of 
the 1990s people had come to realize that this was not the case, and that the future would bring 
rules, registration and formalisation.  
B/ We are dealing with a three-headed reality: 
B.1. Household-informal economic activity for own consumption, mostly by-passing the 
market and money relations, or having marginal dealings with them.  
B.2. Grey economy proper: the production and distribution of legal goods and services 
(including labour) in illegal, semi-legal or unrecorded ways.  
B.3. Black (criminal) economy: the illegal production and distribution of illegal goods 
and services.  
 
These are not air-tight compartments with no interchange between them. In particular, actors of 
the grey economy were found, by use of direct methods, to find no great difficulty in making 
occasional forays into the criminal economy. There is no fundamental difference between 
smuggling cigarettes and smuggling drug precursors.  
 
In terms of policy, it was obvious that not much can or should be done about the informal 
household economy (B.1.); that a stick-and-carrot policy has chances of success in terms of 
pulling actors out of the “grey” and into the light of the formal and registered economy (B.2.); 
and that the criminal economy is a matter of law enforcement rather than economic or 
administrative policy (B.3.).  
 
Such policies did appear. The “stick” came down in 1999, with the rigidly enforced 
implementation of fiscal receipts across the economy; and again in 2003 with the enforced 
registration of all work contracts, existing and new, with the authorities.  
 
The “carrot” was promised in 1999 with the government pledge that the cost of doing business 
would be dramatically decreased with the simplification of legislation, the drastic limitation of 
registration and licensing regimes and the simplification of taxes and their significant reduction. 
This did not start happening until 2003-4, when the government declared: a course of tax 
reductions; the gradual end to investor privileges (eg. the application of encouragement rules to 
domestic as well as foreign investors); a dramatic decrease in licenses and a move to simple 
registration of businesses.  
 
Only some taxation reductions have since been implemented.  
 
Over 2003 Parliament voted a special piece of legislation aimed at creating a business-friendly 
environment and thereby encouraging the move from informality to formality: the Act for 
                                      
3 “The Gray Economy in Bulgaria: reasons, consequences, policies”. Sofia, CSP 2002 
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limiting administrative interference in economic activity. The Act addresses only municipal-
level administrations and is, furthermore, not currently being implemented because of lack of 
administrative capacity.  
 
In Bulgaria increasingly the opinion, shared by the CSP, is that the “grey economy” is to a very 
great extent a consequence of a “grey state” – i.e. of the refusal of the state to see itself as the 
neutral guarantor of rules equal for all, and the propensity of the state to see itself as a corporate 
interest with its own aims and goals. On balance, it is the grey state which puts pressure on 
businesses to stay “grey”, rather than businesses putting pressure on the state for it to become 
involved in under-the-table practices.  
 
Therefore, most policy thinking has concentrated on institutional and administration-related 
responses to informality – i.e. on A/ legislation that sets up rules for formality and B/ on change 
of administrative practices and mechanisms that limits bureaucratic influence, discretion and 
face-to-face contacts with business actors.   
 
Notwithstanding the pernicious influence of corruption (see below), companies are increasingly 
tempted to leave informality and become legitimate. Compared to 2003, today: more companies 
(14 per cent as opposed to 10 per cent) are convinced that there are no significant barriers to 
doing business; and 27 per cent (compared to 20 last year) believe that administrative barriers 
are not the main problem of doing legitimate business4.  
 
This improved climate regarding informality is largely due to several factors, not all of them to 
do with government policy: A/ easier access to bank credit, following years of deficits in this 
area; B/ increasing operations on the international market, where informality is a burden; C/ 
stable macroeconomic environment, encouraging longer-term planning and legality; D/ the trend 
of gradual tax decreases; E/ enforcement of new standards of registration and accountancy and 
the appearance of a National Accounts Office since 2003; F/ continued government promises to 
decrease administrative barriers to doing business which, although only partially fulfilled, create 
a climate of expectations that legality is profitable.  
 
The corruption sub-plot 
 
Corruption is the bridge that links the grey and the black economy. Corruption is a sufficient 
explanation – sufficient cause – of the current government’s notorious inability to limit the 
influence of organized economic-criminal interests.  
 
Just as there is no cardinal difference, to the smuggler, between smuggling cigarettes and 
smuggling drug precursors, so to the corrupt official there is little difference whether he 
represents an industrial lobby or a criminal syndicate that mimics a lobby.  
 
The widespread conviction that corruption is the rule rather than the exception discourages 
investment and expansion plans and slows down the trend of emergence from the informal to the 
formal arena of economic activity.  
 
                                      
4 “Regional Policy and Legislative Reform a Report “, Centre for Economic Development-Sofia, 2004.  
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A cluster of studies5 indicate that there may now be an important divergence between the 
problematic of corruption and the problematic of formality. Corruption seems to be 
concentrating in petty here-and-now bribery (traffic police, medical and teaching personnel) and 
in major deals and / or dealings with entities associated with organized crime. There seems to be 
a lessened impact of corruption, thus organized, on the motivation of economic actors to leave 
the arena of informality and become more formalized.  
 
Rules are bearing fruit, albeit slowly; and businesses have increasing opportunities to avoid or 
minimize corrupt practices and stay legal and legitimate.  
 
The good governance sub-plot 
 
Over recent years the IMF has declared a strategy under which corruption and informal 
economy are a sub-plot to the larger agenda of good governance, defined as “all aspects of the 
way a country is governed, including its economic policies and regulatory framework”.  
 
Of course, once we say “all aspects” we enter the arena of the big master plot. This is where the 
Inregia-Regioplan report makes a considerable contribution by organizing the relevant factors 
into three groups: 1. socio-economic/market; 2. institutional and 3. societal, including cultures 
of everyday life and relations individual-society-state.  
 
 
************************** 
 
 
For a policy to have sustainable results, all of these sub-plots have to be addressed (or – if not 
addressed, this should be a conscious and argued decision), as well as the three major arenas set 
out by Inregia-Regioplan.  
 
We assume that, on the one hand, household-informal work is not to be addressed by policy, and 
that, on the other, the criminal economy is a matter of law enforcement rather than development 
policies – assumptions also made (but not clearly formulated) by the government.  
 
In Bulgaria (and in suchlike countries) this means forming policy at the following levels:  
 
1. Socio-economic.  
 
Here there is common consensus that informal work is encouraged by:  
 
A/ High levels of taxation. A recent I-Watch report finds little overall impact of tax cuts 
since 2002 on the outcome. A person earning 500 EURO per month (a comfortable income) 
ultimately still pays out 55.5% for various taxes, excluding excise and various forms of 
compulsory insurance; and for a hired worker to take home 120 EURO the employer pays out 
202 EURO.  
 
This means that governments have to make more determined efforts to decrease the general 
impact of taxation – something that has been pledged for a number of years.  
                                      
5 “Coalition 2000” – annual reports on corruption; “Centre for Economic Development” – quarterly and 
annual surveys of the business climate. 
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B/ Rigid labour market, underpinned by stringent legislation (Labour Code) and by 
continued government increase of the obligatory minimal wage – something which encourages 
informal payments for work.  
C/ Continued existence of too many registrational and licensing regimes and the 
haphazard introduction of new such regimes as fast as existing ones are being removed by 
legislation.  
D/ Over-regulation of the economy. The instinct of parliament and government is still to 
regulate the market because of the prevailing semi-conscious conviction that the market is a 
dangerous place if left to its own dynamics. The ground-breaking Act on administrative non-
interference is targeted only at the municipal level (whereas most obstacles to business are at 
central government level) and remains, furthermore, non-operational  
 
Declared policy is to minimize the impact of these factors and thereby cut the cost of being 
legal. The process is slow and halting because of the impact of the factors set out below. 
 
 
2. Institutional 
 
This is where short-term policies can and do make an impact on undeclared work.  
 
This has been the case with the obligatory registration, at the beginning of each year, of work 
contracts since January 2003 – something which has brought to light, according to critical 
independent analysts, 180,000 work contracts over the past 15 months (on the base of 3.2 
million total workforce, of which 2.8 million actually employed).  
 
Other effective institutional policies have been:  
- the obligatory use of fiscal receipts for all transactions since 1998 
- the stage-by-stage lowering of the threshold of VAT registration 
- loosening up of stringent central bank controls over bank credit (a trend that is about 
to be overturned for 2005 by a re-tightening of controls), leading to stimuli for 
legality 
- the introduction of international accounting standards since 2003 
- the appearance of a National Accounts Office since 2003 
- the computerization of the tax system and training of tax officials. 
 
When the cumulative impact of such measures outweighs the profits to be made out of staying 
informal and bribing officials, economic actors are motivated to become formalized.  
 
Such results, positive as they are in themselves, are not however sustainable unless policies 
tackle the next and most difficult arena: 
 
3. Societal, including cultures of everyday life and relations individual-society-state 
 
This is where we clearly come to understand that the issue of informal work (and other 
informality) is not to be resolved by economic policies alone, because the problem is not of the 
economy alone.  
 
A political-policy package is necessary. 
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Policy-making in this sense must inevitably address the following major areas in order to make 
sustainable any measures to limit informality under the above headings.  
 
3.1.There are policies suitable for strong states and other policies suitable for weak states.  
 
Strong states (i.e. those seen as efficient, legitimate, impartial, useful and just) are able to 
impose policies of “the stick” because the public would be motivated to obey, seeing the state as 
impartial and fair.  
 
Weak states (seen as not very useful, self-serving and not impartial) should not attempt such 
measures but rather concentrate on policies of “the carrot”: encourage formalization by 
removing obstacles and creating incentives.  
 
The usual mistake (made in Bulgaria for example) by weak states is to over-compensate for their 
lack of legitimacy and support by trying to be overbearing and heavy-handed – and inevitably 
concentrating on the “stick” rather than the “carrot”. And just as inevitably not arriving at the 
desired results.  
 
Which means that, while other policies can and should be implemented, a reform of 
administrative cultures and practices is of fundamental significance. And it is here that weak 
states perform badly: they not only find it difficult to understand the sense of such reform, but 
actively oppose it, feeling (quite correctly) that it takes away their discretionary powers. An 
evaluation of  the degree of success of administrative reform in any CEE country would 
immediately tell you what kind of state are you dealing with – and what policies it can or cannot 
take.  
 
In fact, it should not be very difficult for the EC to produce a matrix of states in terms of their 
strength / weakness and thereafter base policy on this distinction. Eg. what will work for 
Slovenia (strong and legitimate state) will not work for Macedonia (weak state). 
 
3.2.There are policies suitable for modernized societies and other policies suitable for weakly-
modernised societies. 
 
Pre-modern societies are those, where the individual relies on the unwritten codes of conduct 
and the informal solidarity of the group; and the individual is seen as less important than the 
group or other large entities (the state).  
 
Modern societies are those, in which the individual relies on written rules upheld by formal 
institutions; and the individual is seen as more important than institutions.  
 
Pre-modern societies are informal. Modern societies are formal.  
 
Therefore, for policies limiting informality to be sustainable, they need to be underpinned by 
larger policies of modernization in countries, such as Bulgaria, where modernization was partial 
and incomplete before the arrival of the communist regime.  
 
This requires a sustained effort based on: a/ education of the public at large to change the 
dominant assumptions that see informality as the rule; b/ re-training of key players in the 
modern values of formality and institutional behaviour; c/ completing a wide-ranging reform of 
the education system aimed at encouraging modern attitudes and behaviour patterns.  
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While in Bulgaria a/ is happening on an on-off basis, b/ and c/ are not taking place. This is the 
reason why the World Bank has discontinued the funding of both the administrative reform and 
of education reform.  
 
A concerted national and international effort, therefore, is needed tin countries such as Bulgaria 
to ensure that administrative and education reforms take place. The fact that there are no acquis 
in the field of education is an unfortunate problem, but not an insuperable one.  
 
Without such effort countries such as Bulgaria will continue to lean in favour of informality, 
including – informal work. 
 
3.3 There are policies suitable for zero-sum mentalities and other policies suitable for win-win 
mentalities.  
 
Weakly modernized societies are zero-sum societies: if someone has a lot of something, then he 
has unjustly taken it from other people.  
 
Usually this has been interpreted as “egalitarian mentalities”, which is true: such societies see 
“the rich” as the bad guys and therefore affluence is not a strong life-motive.  
 
There is another outcome also: such societies assume that the government is self-serving and not 
impartial. Therefore: a/ people expect officials to be corrupt (and corrupt official behaviour 
underpins this belief) and b/ people believe that business success depends on patronage from 
government, rather than on competitiveness in the marketplace.  
 
Such societies do not believe words but daily behaviour patterns – and therefore action on 
behaviour, rather than education and propaganda, is the level at which policy should be pitched. 
 
For policies against informality to work, therefore, you need additional stamina in the fight 
against corruption, and also – to (again) re-structure and re-train administration at all levels. In 
this way you can demonstrate through daily institutional behaviour that the zero-sum mentality 
is not the road to success.  
 
 
 
Systemic change can be attained by such integrated policy approaches. Without them, 
short-term and at best incremental progress is possible.  
 
